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“SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY”: THE PROMISE AND 




If the Holy Grail of financial reform is ending large financial firms’ 
status as “too big to fail,” most observers agree it remains elusive. The 
Dodd-Frank Act purported to solve the problem through the creation of a 
new mechanism for the resolution of failed financial behemoths called the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA).1 As it was outlined in the statute, 
however, the OLA was widely deemed inadequate.2 Now, pursuant to their 
Dodd-Frank authorities, regulators are poised to adopt a new resolution 
approach that has reanimated hopes for a credible solution to the too-big-to-
fail problem. The approach combines a strategy of “single point of entry” 
(SPOE) resolution for systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs)3—involving the resolution of the SIFI’s parent holding company 
while leaving its operating subsidiaries untouched—with a requirement that 
SIFIs issue a minimum amount of long-term debt.4 This piece briefly 
describes the problem this proposed approach aims to solve and assesses its 
likely efficacy, focusing on the long-term debt requirement. The good news 
is that the long-term debt requirement will likely improve financial stability 
and reduce the probability of bailouts. We should nevertheless view with 
skepticism the claim that the long-term debt requirement and the SPOE 
approach provide a definitive solution to the too-big-to-fail problem. 
 
 Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to 
Abe Cable, Bill Dodge, Jared Ellias, Cathy Hwang, Mike Klausner, Stephen Lubben, Zachary Price, 
Morris Ratner, and participants at the UC Hastings Junior Faculty Workshop for helpful comments on 
early drafts of this essay. 
1
  12 U.S.C. § 5384 (2013) [http://perma.cc/S6EW-U4TC]. 
2
  See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 117–27 (2011). 
3
  Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 
78 Fed. Reg. 76614 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter FDIC Proposed Rule] 
[http://perma.cc/WV58-LWFM]. The rule, which has not yet been finalized, does not supersede the 
FDIC’s powers under OLA, but rather attempts to flesh out how it would employ those powers. 
4
  The long-term debt proposal has been postponed, likely until 2015. Ryan Tracy, Fed’s Long-term 
Debt Rule May Slip to 2015, MONEYBEAT (June 10, 2014, 6:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
moneybeat/2014/06/10/feds-long-term-debt-rule-may-slip-to-2015 [http://perma.cc/MVR2-YYXD]. 
Authority for the rule arises from Dodd-Frank § 165, which empowers the Federal Reserve to prescribe 
enhanced prudential standards for SIFIs. 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2013) [http://perma.cc/RF5F-NCXB]. 
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I. THE PROBLEM 
The dilemma financial regulators faced repeatedly in 2008 can be 
analogized to the problem of a fictional drought-stricken town whose fire 
department chief is anxious about private citizens setting off home 
fireworks throughout the summer.5 Concerned about spotty enforcement of 
a prohibition on the fireworks, the chief announces that the department will 
deny its services to any citizen who sets his or her house ablaze with home 
fireworks.6 When someone ignores the admonition and his house catches 
fire, the chief may face an unpalatable choice: either allow the fire to 
continue at risk of grave danger to the lives and property of innocent 
parties; or renege on the threat, thereby undermining the department’s 
credibility, rewarding the rule breaker, and increasing others’ incentive to 
flout department directives and take excessive risks going forward. 
The fire chief may face such a nasty choice, but there is a third 
possibility: if sufficient firebreaks exist around the property in question, it 
should be possible to let the fire burn without running too great a risk that it 
will spread. 
The analogy to financial crises and the goals of reform is 
straightforward. Drought conditions correspond to a fragile market, where 
creditors fear for the solvency of the entire system. When a SIFI falters, 
bailing it out is like dousing the amateur pyrotechnician’s home and is 
objectionable for the same reasons: it wastes public resources, protects 
those who took excessive risk from the consequences of their actions, and 
removes the incentives of others to curb their risk-taking going forward.7 
On the other hand, allowing the institution to fail may cause losses to 
propagate through the financial system and the real economy,8 thus harming 
innocent bystanders. The collateral damage from a SIFI’s failure can be as 
terrifying as an uncontrolled fire. 
Regulators need credible firebreaks—a way to stop panic and losses 
from spreading—in order to escape the awful choice between a bailout and 
risking a financial wildfire. Of particular concern in building such 
firebreaks is a special class of creditor, namely depositors and those who 
hold deposit-like, short-term debt outside the traditional banking system.9 
 
5
  The fire analogy for financial crises is, of course, well established. See, e.g., Charles A.E. 
Goodhart & Enrico Perotti, Preventive Macroprudential Policy, VOX (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/preventive-macroprudential-policy [http://perma.cc/4JXW-HLTV]. 
6
  For purposes of the stylized example, assume perfect visibility into fire causes. 
7
  The analogy, of course, is not perfect, for SIFIs may fail even if they are not engaged in activities 
deemed too risky ex ante. The ex post dilemma faced by regulators, however, remains structurally 
similar. 
8
  For an account of loss propagation mechanisms in a financial crisis, see John Crawford, 
Wargaming Financial Crises: The Problem of (In)Experience and Regulator Expertise, REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. (forthcoming 2014). 
9
  A primary example of deposit-like debt outside the traditional banking system is the “repurchase 
agreement,” or “repo,” where a depositor (such as a money market fund) will lend a bank (such as a 
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Such debt creates the risk of a run on the issuing institution, with all its 
attendant pernicious effects.10 Unlike traditional bond investors, who care 
primarily about risk-adjusted return, holders of deposit-like debt care 
primarily about two things: (i) immediate access to the cash due them when 
the debt matures (or on demand, as with bank deposits); and (ii) full 
recovery of the principal of their deposit or deposit-like loan. These may be 
termed, respectively, the “no delay” and “no haircut”11 conditions for run 
prevention.12 
When fear overwhelms greed in markets, the violation of one or both 
conditions for deposit-like debt issued by a SIFI can inspire a run on other 
similar institutions.13 This “contagion by simile” is one of the key channels 
of loss propagation in a crisis. Preventing this dynamic requires meeting 
both the no delay and the no haircut conditions for deposit-like debt, either 
at the failed institution itself, or, by explicit guarantees, at other firms 
throughout the system subsequent to the failure. A strategy to meet these 
conditions constitutes an essential financial firebreak. 
Until the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), the traditional banking system could not meet these conditions and 
was consequently extremely vulnerable to periodic systemic panics.14 The 
FDIC largely ended panics in the traditional banking system. It meets the no 
delay condition through the extraordinary discretionary authority it has to 
resolve member banks: an FDIC receivership team may descend upon a 
failed bank at 5 P.M. on a Friday and complete a transfer (usually 
prearranged) of all bank accounts to a solvent bank by the following 
Monday morning.15 This degree of speed—and the ability to avoid delay in 
 
broker-dealer) cash with high-quality securities as collateral. The transaction is short-term (often 
overnight) but is routinely rolled over, thus functioning very much like a demand deposit. See GARY B. 
GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 43–44 (2010). 
10
  Allowing firms to issue such debt and then use the funds to make investments in the real 
economy is socially valuable, but creates a risk of financial instability. This problem was “solved” for 
traditional banking through a combination of extensive regulation and supervision, lender-of-last-resort 
functions, and deposit insurance. There is a persuasive argument that a similar regime should be applied 
to these non-traditional forms of deposit-like debt. See Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After 
the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 75, 103–22 (2011) [http://perma.cc/MD3T-GHXE]. Such a regime 
does not, however, appear to be in the offing. 
11
  A haircut is a financial term for losses imposed on creditors. If a creditor lends a company $100 
and suffers a five percent haircut when the firm goes bankrupt, the creditor will receive a distribution of 
$95. 
12
  Ricks makes a similar point when he discusses the importance of liquidity and price protection 
for deposit-like creditors. Id. at 89–93. 
13
  This was a common theme in late 2008. For example, in the ten days following Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy filing, Morgan Stanley cash holdings fell by almost half, representing a run of $85 billion. 
Darrell Duffie, Liquidity and Stress Testing, FED. RES. BANK N. Y.. http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
aboutthefed/liquidity_stress_612.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) [http://perma.cc/A669-Z8MF]. 
14
  See, e.g., BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 9–10 (2013) 
(identifying six banking panics between 1873 and 1914). 
15
  See, e.g., RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 502 (5th ed. 
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depositors’ access to their accounts—would be impossible under normal 
bankruptcy procedures. The FDIC can meet the no haircut condition by 
guaranteeing full payment of deposits under the insurance cap and through 
ad hoc insurance of deposits over the cap if a “systemic risk exception” is 
invoked.16 
Traditional commercial banks were at the periphery of the 2008 
financial crisis, however. The heart of the crisis involved large financial 
conglomerates that often did not even include deposit-taking institutions in 
their labyrinthine organizational charts, but which nevertheless issued 
billions of dollars of deposit-like debt.17 Regulators scrambled to contain the 
fire, sometimes bailing out specific institutions and sometimes erecting ad 
hoc firebreaks such as vast emergency liquidity and guarantee programs.18 
These measures, however justified, enraged critics on both the left and 
right, propelling the post-crisis reform effort. 
II. TWO STABS AT A SOLUTION 
One of the chief aims of financial reform in the wake of the crisis was 
to provide regulators with a way to navigate between the Scylla of bailouts 
and the Charybdis of catastrophic collateral damage. The Dodd-Frank Act 
attempted to chart this course with the OLA, which, as noted, was widely 
acknowledged as inadequate to the task set for it. While it provided for the 
appointment of the FDIC as receiver of a failed SIFI and formally mirrored 
many features of the FDIC’s receivership authority over commercial banks, 
it was considerably less likely than traditional bank resolution to meet the 
no delay condition for deposit-like debt.19 This is because the legal and 
technical issues involved in a SIFI resolution, for example with respect to 
capital structure and cross-border jurisdiction, are orders of magnitude more 




  12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2013) [http://perma.cc/VK2S-AM7Z]. Note that during the crisis, the 
FDIC provided comprehensive guarantees above and beyond the traditional insurance cap to creditors of 
all commercial banks. See, e.g., TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL 
CRISES 232–33 (2014). While the Dodd-Frank Act rescinded the FDIC’s authority to provide this sort of 
“widely available debt guarantee program,” the systemic risk exception can still be invoked for 
individual institutions that are being wound down in an FDIC receivership. 12 U.S.C. § 5613 (2013) 
[http://perma.cc/775S-6DL4]. 
17
  Lehman Brothers, for example, included no deposit-taking institution in its corporate family and 
so benefited neither from the FDIC’s resolution powers nor from its insurance. It had borrowed many 
billions of dollars in the repo market, however. See, e.g., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Quarterly 
Report (Form 10-Q) (July 10, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman 10-Q] [http://perma.cc/GA44-Y79Z]. 
18
  For a comprehensive account of the government’s crisis response measures, see DAVIS POLK & 
WARDWELL LLP, FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL (2009) [http://perma.cc/MP4T-AU3H]. 
19
  A good critique of the pre-SPOE version of the OLA can be found in Stephen J. Lubben, 
Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U. CIN. L. REV 485 (2012) [http://perma.cc/ 
66D8-TK74]. 
20
  See id. passim. It is worth noting that the “living wills” prescribed by Dodd-Frank were meant to 
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Frank included no effort to address the no haircut condition.21 Providing a 
guarantee for a certain class of debt would likely have been seen as 
exacerbating, rather than solving, the too-big-to-fail problem. But in failing 
to construct credible firebreaks by protecting a particular class of creditors, 
the law failed to make credible its “no bailout” threat for institutions. 
The new rules relating to SPOE and long-term debt requirements aim 
to address the shortcomings of the original law and have generated a good 
deal of excitement in the process.22 First, the FDIC’s proposed SPOE 
strategy for resolving SIFIs could, if successful, satisfy the no delay 
condition for preventing contagion. The strategy takes advantage of a quirk 
in the organizational structure of U.S. SIFIs: they are conglomerates with a 
holding company at the top and a dizzying array of operating subsidiaries 
beneath.23 The holding company tends not to engage in operations; it issues 
equity and long-term debt and invests most of the funds in its operating 
subsidiaries.24 The operating subsidiaries, in turn, tend to fund themselves 
not only with equity and longer-term debt from their parent but also with 
deposit-like debt from third parties. It is the deposit-like debt from third 
parties that is of particular concern from a systemic viewpoint. The SPOE 
strategy would involve the liquidation of the holding company only; the 
subsidiaries would be transferred untouched, with no hiccup in operations, 
to a newly created “bridge” holding company.25 The subsidiaries would be 
recapitalized by having their debts to the parent forgiven and perhaps by 
having parent assets (such as cash) transferred to them (in exchange, for 
example, for new equity shares issued by the subsidiary).26 Under this 
arrangement, holders of the subsidiaries’ deposit-like debt would have 
immediate access to their cash as the claims mature, just as if the SIFI had 
not failed. 
In contrast, the shareholders of the original parent would likely be 
wiped out, and the long-term creditors would receive equity in the new 
bridge holding company in exchange for their debt claims against the old 
holding company.27 It is important to note that these long-term creditors 
 
address this issue, but have been a disappointment. Peter Eavis, Federal Reserve and F.D.I.C. Fault Big 
Banks’ ‘Living Wills,’ DEALBOOK (Aug. 5, 2014, 8:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/ 
federal-reserve-and-f-d-i-c-fault-big-banks-living-wills [http://perma.cc/8T4E-MWPR]. 
21
  See Ricks, supra note 10, at 126. 
22
  See, e.g., Joint Comment Letter from John Court, et al. to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, FDIC 
7–10 (Feb. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Joint Comment Letter] (quoting optimistic comments by, among 
others, Federal Reserve Board Chair Janet Yellen, Federal Reserve Board Governors Jerome Powell and 
Daniel Tarullo, Federal Reserve Bank of New York President William Dudley, and former FDIC Chair 
Sheila Bair) [http://perma.cc/U3S9-64QV]. 
23
  See FDIC Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 76615. 
24
  Id. 
25
  Id. at 76615–17. 
26
  Id. at 76617. 
27
  Id. at 76617–19. 
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would be quite different from deposit-like creditors; they would be 
investing primarily for risk-adjusted return rather than for liquidity and the 
assurance of full recovery, and they (and those similarly positioned at other 
institutions) would not be able to run. There are several trenchant critiques 
of the practical obstacles to making the SPOE strategy work.28 No one 
doubts, however, that it is much more promising than the original law, and 
there is optimism that the kinks can be worked out.29 In short, by shifting 
focus from the tangled web of myriad subsidiaries to the single parent atop 
the SIFI structure, the “approach is a classic simplifier, making theoretically 
possible something that [had previously] seemed impossibly complex.”30 
For the SPOE strategy to succeed in creating financial firebreaks 
around a faltering SIFI, however, the no haircut condition for deposit-like 
debt must also be met. To this end, the Federal Reserve plans to issue a 
proposed rule requiring SIFIs to maintain extra loss-absorbing capacity at 
the holding company level beyond the heightened capital requirements 
already applied to SIFIs.31 This will—as the FDIC confidently asserts 
throughout its proposed SPOE rule—ensure that the holding company has 
enough equity and long-term debt to absorb all the losses of the 
consolidated SIFI.32 The systemically important, deposit-like debt of the 
subsidiaries will not suffer any loss as long as the holding company has 
enough loss-absorbing capacity. 
III. BANK CAPITAL: LONG-TERM DEBT VS. EQUITY 
The key measure of a bank or bank holding company’s ability to 
absorb losses is its capital. Capital in this context refers to equity and 
equity-like instruments. Banks can (already) count limited amounts of 
subordinated long-term debt as capital for certain purposes. While equity 
 
28
  See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, OLA After Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?, in AN 
UNFINISHED MISSION: MAKING WALL STREET WORK FOR US 13 (Mike Konczal & Marcus Stanley ed., 
2013) [http://perma.cc/7WUP-3FJJ]; David A. Skeel Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy 
Alternative, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Martin Neil 
Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014). 
29
  Joint Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 7–10. 
30
  Jerome Powell, Governor, Fed. Reserve, Ending “Too Big to Fail,” Remarks at the Institute of 
International Bankers 2013 Washington Conference (Mar. 4, 2013) [http://perma.cc/L66V-XD7R]. 
31
  See Tracy, supra note 4. 
32
  See, e.g., FDIC Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 76617 (“The bridge financial company would 
have a strong balance sheet with assets significantly greater than liabilities since unsecured debt 
obligations would be left as claims in the receivership while all assets will be transferred.”). The 
Proposed Rule does clarify that in the case of insufficient loss-absorbing capacity at the parent level, key 
subsidiaries would be put into resolution and the subsidiaries’ deposit-like creditors would be subject to 
haircuts. Id. at 76623. If the bailout-or-wildfire choice arises, then, the implicit formal requirement of 
the law is to let it burn. Some critics, however, believe that the FDIC’s authority to provide liquidity to a 
firm in SPOE resolution creates the possibility of a backdoor bailout. Any such lending would have to 
be fully secured, id. at 76616; it may, however, be possible to meet the letter but not the spirit of the law 
by making a few optimistic assumptions about the subsidiaries’ value. 
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claimants (i.e., shareholders) cannot withdraw any funds from a faltering 
firm, long-term creditors cannot withdraw their principal until the debt 
matures. If a SIFI issues long-term debt on a staggered basis, it can ensure 
that not too much of it will mature at any one time. Both long-term debt and 
equity, then, are sources of funding that cannot flee en masse in a crisis. 
A long-term debt requirement for SIFIs is laudable in part because it 
could help break a logjam on what many view as the most important matter 
of unfinished business in post-crisis financial reform: increasing bank 
capital levels. While required capital levels for SIFIs have risen since the 
crisis, critics believe they remain too low.33 Indeed, the mere fact of a 
proposed new long-term debt requirement constitutes an implicit admission 
by regulators that current capital levels remain too low to absorb all losses 
in a crisis. In the face of intense resistance from banks, however, efforts to 
impose significantly higher equity requirements have fizzled.34 The need to 
coordinate with international regulatory counterparts exacerbates this 
political problem.35 Banks’ resistance to higher equity requirements, 
however, has not appeared to extend to the long-term debt requirement.36 
The long-term debt requirement could thus help break the gridlock and 
force SIFIs to fund themselves to a much greater degree from sources that 
are not systemically vulnerable. In this respect, it should greatly increase 
the resiliency of the financial system. 
It is, of course, important to emphasize that long-term debt is a good 
substitute for equity from a systemic perspective only if the SPOE approach 
works as advertised in preserving market confidence and meeting the no 
delay condition. If the SPOE approach does work, then it should not matter 
from a systemic standpoint whether those absorbing losses in a resolution 
 
33
  See, e.g., ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT passim (2013). 
34
  The most notable U.S. effort in this regard was an amendment sponsored by Senators Sherrod 
Brown and David Vitter in 2013 that passed the Senate but failed in the House. See Shahien Nasiripour 
& Michael McAuliff, With the Lights On, 99 Senators Voted Against Wall Street. The Lights Went Off 
and They All Fled, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2013, 8:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/12/17/budget-deal-2013-megabanks_n_4462305.html [http://perma.cc/65ZQ-EBAU]. 
35
  See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, When She Talks, Banks Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/business/when-she-talks-banks-shudder.html (summarizing a 
speech by Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer, in part: “If other countries aren’t willing to 
impose stricter capital requirements on their own banks—and they don’t appear to be—then unilateral 
increases would hurt the American banking industry and the broader economy.”) 
[http://perma.cc/5VRG-T3HP]. The risk of regulatory and jurisdictional arbitrage and of cross-border 
spillovers in financial instability make harmonized regulation on this point very important. 
36
  This is likely because of the tax advantage of debt: interest payments are deductible, while 
dividend payments are not. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 33, passim, argue persuasively that 
regulators should lean against the anti-equity bias created by this disparate tax treatment. Whether for 
good reasons or bad, however, significantly higher equity requirements appear unlikely in the 
foreseeable future. 
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are equity claimants or long-term creditors.37 What matters for stability is 
avoiding haircuts for the deposit-like third-party creditors of the SIFI 
subsidiaries, and this depends not on the particular mix of equity and long-
term debt at the parent level but rather on their sufficiency in combination 
to absorb all the SIFI’s losses. To the degree there are lingering concerns 
over SPOE’s mechanics, however, it would be better to take steps to avoid 
SIFI resolution in the first place, as even a SIFI with sufficient loss-
absorbing capital could touch off a panic if a botched resolution delayed its 
deposit-like creditors’ access to their cash. The most straightforward way to 
avoid resolution would be to minimize the risk of SIFI insolvency. A firm is 
insolvent when its liabilities (including long-term debt) exceed its assets—
in other words, when its losses outstrip its equity buffer. If our goal is to 
avoid resolution in the first place, then more equity, by making insolvency 
less likely, is preferable to more long-term debt. 
On the other hand, long-term debt has advantages that go beyond lower 
levels of bank resistance. For example, it is easier to measure and less 
subject to gaming than equity38 and can provide better information about 
downside risks.39 In any event, the decisive factor that should provide real 
(if qualified) comfort to financial reformers is that a long-term debt 
requirement will increase the stability of SIFI funding in a way that would 
likely be politically infeasible were equity our only recourse. 
IV. REALITY CHECK 
If our concern is ending the too-big-to-fail problem, however, the key 
question is whether the required loss-absorbing capacity at the parent 
company will, in fact, be enough.40 While we await the proposed rule from 
 
37
  See Joseph H. Sommer, Why Bail-In? And How!, 20 ECON. POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 28–29) [http://perma.cc/3VQ9-7R3X]. While the strongest form of capital, common 
equity, can absorb losses before any creditors suffer haircuts, long-term debt in a SPOE regime would be 
able to absorb losses before systemically important creditors suffered haircuts. 
38
  See id. (manuscript at 28). The loss-absorbing capacity of debt at any given point from the 
issuer’s perspective is simply the remaining principal and accrued interest. Equity, on the other hand, 
measures the difference between a firm’s assets and liabilities and an accurate measure of it requires an 
accurate measure of asset values. This can be much trickier and a few excessively optimistic 
assumptions can make a weak institution appear strong. See infra note 43. 
39
  Equity cannot provide downside information as effectively as debt because a small chance of 
large gains may lead to a high share price even in the face of significant default risk. 
40
  David Skeel observes that a holistic approach to assessing SPOE’s effectiveness must look to its 
timely invocation by regulators, prior to the point where a SIFI’s losses outstrip its loss-absorbing 
capacity. See Skeel, supra note 28 (manuscript at 11). If regulators put a SIFI into resolution “on time” 
in this sense, then there should always be sufficient loss-absorbing capacity. So why worry about the 
size of the buffer? There is, for a variety of reasons, a regulatory bias toward delay in these situations. 
There is hope that the problem will resolve itself, fear of unintended consequences from action, and 
concern that proactive steps will shift blame to regulators for bad outcomes that would have occurred 
regardless of their actions. When one adds to all this the difficulty of measuring assets accurately in a 
volatile market, it is perhaps not surprising that regulators do not always act before the firm’s solvency 
is in question. 
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the Federal Reserve, there are reasons to be skeptical. The Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) recently proposed a requirement for SIFIs to 
maintain total loss-absorbing capacity – in equity and long-term debt – of 
between 16 and 20 percent of risk-weighted assets.41 Would a ratio in this 
general range be adequate? It is worth observing that a few months prior to 
its demise, Lehman Brothers reported a ratio of total capital-to-risk-
weighted assets of 16.1 percent.42 In the Lehman case, of course, the 
problem of mismeasurement looms at least as large as the problem of 
insufficiency, but mismeasurement can be difficult to detect in a bubble.43 A 
sufficiently large loss-absorbing buffer probably constitutes our best 
(though hardly only) protection against the risk of mismeasurement.44 
Despite the measurement problem, the Lehman case remains 
instructive and implies that capital levels would have to rise to implausibly 
high levels to solve the too-big-to-fail problem once and for all. Consider 
that Lehman’s reported total assets in May 2008 came to approximately 
$639 billion;45 estimates of total creditor losses in the wake of Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy have run as high as $200 billion (31 percent of total 
assets).46 It is also worth noting that prior to the establishment of the FDIC, 
bank capital levels typically exceeded 25 percent of total assets,47 but this 
failed to stop crippling panics from striking every decade or two.48 Indeed, 
 
41
  FIN. STABILITY BD., ADEQUACY OF LOSS-ABSORBING CAPACITY OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT BANKS IN RESOLUTION (2014) [HTTP://PERMA.CC/VJ8E-36XM].  It is important to note that 
with special capital surcharges, the required total loss-absorbing capacity under the FSB’s approach 
could rise as high as 25 percent of risk-weighted assets for the largest SIFIs. Id. at 13. It is widely 
expected that the Federal Reserve’s proposed rule will closely track the FSB’s approach. 
42
  Lehman 10-Q, supra note 17, at 102. 
43
  Firms and banks always have some discretion in valuing their assets, whether it be business loans 
for commercial banks or infrequently traded securities for broker-dealers. A few optimistic assumptions 
about, for example, losses given default on certain loans, can have a significant impact on the magnitude 
of reported assets. 
44
  While the measurement problem may be partially mitigated by measuring capital against total 
assets rather than risk-weighted assets, it would not be eliminated. See Matt Levine, Relatively Simple 
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the history of banking prior to federal deposit insurance should inspire 
skepticism that capital requirements, as important as they are, can serve as a 
prophylactic panacea for panics. 
We should not make the perfect the enemy of the good: SPOE is a 
tremendous improvement over the original OLA, and the long-term debt 
requirement holds the promise of strengthening SIFI balance sheets 
significantly and helping us resolve SIFIs without bailouts or systemic 
aftershocks. But we should not permit optimism about the potential of the 
new resolution approach to blind us to lingering weaknesses in the financial 
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